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ANALYSIS
Israel asks EU to assess 
its DP law for adequacy
Article 25.1 of European UnionDirective 95/46/EC prohibitstransfers of personal data from
Member States of the European Union
(EU) to “third countries” – that is,
countries outside the EU (and EEA) if
the third country in question does not
ensure an “adequate level of protec-
tion”. The power to make binding
adequacy determinations lies with the
European Commission (Art 25(6)).
The principal methodological
criteria for assessing the adequacy of a
data protection regime are set out by
the Article 29 Data Protection Working
Party in WP12: Transfers of personal
data to third countries: Applying Arti-
cles 25 and 26 of the EU data
protection directive. WP12 reflects the
main requirements of Directive
95/46/EC and other international data
protection instruments. While the core
criteria listed in WP12 do not have any
formal legal standing, they serve, de
facto, as the measure against which the
adequacy of data protection regimes is
evaluated. 
THE ISRAELI DP REGIME
The highest norm protecting privacy is
found in s.7(a) of Israel’s Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty, which
provides that “All persons have the
right to privacy and to intimacy.” As
the Israeli Supreme Court has recog-
nised, the Basic Law elevated privacy to
a status of a constitutional right. The
second level in the normative pyramid
is the Privacy Protection Act of 1981
(hereafter: PPA), which has been
amended eight times (PL&B Interna-
tional, September 2002, pp.25-27).
Chapter 1 of the PPA applies to
both manual and electronic data. It
prohibits the violation of privacy of any
person without that person’s consent,
and provides for civil and criminal
liability. Chapter 2, which regulates
databases, includes both a general
arrangement (subchapter 1) and
concrete rules regarding direct
marketing (subchapter 2). Chapter 4 of
the PPA contains rules about the
transfer of data held by the government
and other statutory bodies among
themselves and to private bodies.
The PPA’s database regime defines a
database as “a collection of data, kept
by magnetic or optical means and
intended for computer processing”.
Manual records are thus excluded from
chapter 2 of the PPA. However, manual
databases are subject to the general
right to privacy. 
The law distinguishes between
“information” and “sensitive informa-
tion”. “Information” is defined as
details regarding a person’s person-
ality, personal status, private affairs,
health, economic situation, profes-
sional qualifications, opinions and
faith. “Sensitive information” includes
all elements of “information” with the
exceptions of personal status and
professional status. Therefore, it
should be underlined that the concept
of “sensitive information” in Israeli
law encompasses a much broader set
of data than it does in the European
Directive 95/46.
The PPA vests most of the powers
for enforcing the data protection regime
in the Database Registrar. The Registrar
is appointed by the government and
integrated within the structure of the
Ministry of Justice and, in that sense, is
part of the executive branch. However,
in practice, we are unaware of any inter-
vention with the decisions of the
Registrar. Moreover, having several
quasi-judicial powers (mostly the regis-
tration of databases), some of the
Registrar’s decisions can be appealed to
a court, and all activities are subject to
general judicial review under principles
of constitutional and administrative law.
IS THE ISRAELI DP 
REGIME ADEQUATE?
According to the European Commis-
sion’s WP12, the concept of adequate
protection differs from the concepts of
equivalent protection or sufficient
protection. Equivalency would have
required a strict analytical comparison
between the third country’s legal
scheme and the EU Directive. In other
words, the criterion of an equivalent
protection would have required third
countries to adopt legislation which
might be considered as an exact copy of
the Directive. With the adequate
protection requirement, the question is
different. The use of the term
“adequate” is meaningful and perfectly
translates the pragmatism of the Euro-
pean approach.
As stated in WP12, the approach
takes into account the content of the
applicable regulations (the purpose
limitation principle, data quality and
proportionality principle, transparency
principle, security principle, rights of
access, rectification and right to object,
restrictions on onward transfers) and
the effectiveness. We examine the Israeli
data protection regime according to this
approach.
1. The purpose limitation principle is
a central pillar of the PPA: In the
context of the general right to privacy,
it appears in s.2(9), which defines, as a
violation of privacy, the “using or
transferring information on a person’s
private affairs, otherwise than for the
purpose for which it was given”. As for
databases, s.8(b) states: “No person
shall use information in a database that
must be registered under this section,
except for the purposes for which the
database was set up.”
2. Accurate and up-to-date data: No
explicit provision in the PPA imposes
on the owner or possessor of manual
data or manual databases a requirement
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to update or amend inaccurate data.
However, in the context of electronic
databases, these principles are assured
through s.14 of the PPA, which accords
data subjects the right to require the
amendment of data.
3. Adequate, relevant and not excessive
data: Unlike article 6(c) of the European
Directive, the PPA does not explicitly
require that data should be “adequate,
relevant and not excessive in relation to
the purposes for which they are trans-
ferred or further processed”, nor does
the PPA contain a provision ensuring
that data are only conserved for a
reasonable time given the purpose for
which they were collected. However,
given the importance of the data
subject’s consent in the underlying
philosophy of the law (PPA s.1 reads:
“No person shall infringe the privacy of
another without his consent”), one
could claim that it has the same effect as
the European principle. When inade-
quate, irrelevant or excessive data
collection is required by a contract, a
data subject can petition the special
court on “standard contracts” and
request that the contractual section be
invalidated. Usually, it is the Attorney
General who initiates such procedures,
including in the Bank Leumi case, in
which the court interfered with the stan-
dard contract on data protection issues.
4. Principle of transparency: In the
context of manual data and manual
databases, no explicit provision in the
PPA requires a data controller to notify
the data subject as to the purpose of the
processing. As for the database regime,
PPA, s.11 requires that an application
to a person to collect information for
the purpose of keeping it in a database
should be accompanied by a notice,
referring, inter alia, to the purpose of
the processing and the identity of the
data controller. Furthermore, a database
that meets one of several situations
listed in s.8(c) needs to be registered
with the Database Registrar.
5. Security principle: An owner of a
database, its possessor or operator, are
under duty to maintain the security of
the data (s.17). Data Security is defined
as the “protection of the integrity of
data, or protection of the data against
exposure, use or copying, all when
done without due permission”.
6. The rights of access, rectification
and objection: Israeli law accords the
data subject with rights of access and
rectification, accompanied with proce-
dural guarantees. Moreover, in the
context of databases having a direct
marketing purpose, the PPA grants the
data subjects a right to object to the
processing of data relating to them.
7. Onward transfers to third coun-
tries: Special regulations address the
transfer of data to databases which are
located outside Israel: Regulations for
Protection of Privacy (Transfer of Data
to Databases outside the Country),
2001. It is evident that these regulations
are inspired by the EU Directive since
these are based on the same principles.
8. Sensitive data: An additional partic-
ular safeguard concerning sensitive
information is the fact that if a database
includes such information, this immedi-
ately triggers the duty to register the
database with the Database Registrar.
9. Direct Marketing: The operation
and holding of a database for the
purpose of direct marketing triggers
stricter regulation than a “regular”
database. In addition to the duties
imposed on regular databases, a direct
marketing database must be registered
with the Registrar. Moreover, s.17F(b)
allows a data subject to object, in
writing, to the processing of data
relating to him, that is, the data subject
can require that data referring to him or
her be deleted. Alternatively, the data
subject can require the database owner
that the data referring to him or her will
not be transferred by the database
owner to third parties, for a limited
time or for any time.
10. Automated decisions: Current
Israeli law does not contain any specific
instructions regarding automated deci-
sions. However, it is clear that when
such automated decisions are taken by
a public body, they are subject to judi-
cial scrutiny like any other executive
decision.
11. Enforcement: Apart from the
informal Registrar’s competence to
receive individual complaints, adminis-
trative and judicial routes of
enforcement are foreseen. The Registrar
can impose administrative fines and the
PPA provides for dissuasive criminal
sanctions and private civil enforcement.
its mistake and stopped sending the e-
mails. Although most of the messages sent
were retrieved with the help of a portal site
operator, 640 had already been opened.
Coincidentally, a decision taken by a
court in South Korea at the same time pro-
vided the affected bank customers with
some encouragement. An online game-site
operator that had managed its users' infor-
mation poorly (PL&B International,
December 2006, pp.12-13) was ordered by
the court to pay 500,000 won ($500) com-
pensation to each to game player in ques-
tion. In April 2006, the court ruled that the
online game company has contractual and
legal responsibilities to protect the private
information of game players. In other words,
providers of internet-based services, such
as online game operators, are required to
perform a duty of special care to protect the
private information of their users as they
make commercial profit from their services.
The internet lottery players demanded 
3 million won ($3,000) per person from the
bank for the mental suffering that arose out
of their private information being leaked.
The total amount of compensation demand-
ed by the plaintiffs amounted to more than 
4 billion won ($4 million).
On February 8, 2007, the Seoul Central
District Court held that the bank in the case
of the internet lottery players should pay
100,000 won ($1,000) to each person
whose name, e-mail address and national
ID number were accidentally leaked. The
court said that the plaintiffs suffered
because their fundamental right to preserve
their private information in safety was tres-
passed contrary to their will and that they
deserved the compensation for the mental
suffering they experienced. Also, the court
pointed out that the bank had made every
effort to stop the leakage of private informa-
tion and there was no report of actual dam-
age. Accordingly, the court limited the com-
pensation to 100,000 won ($100) per per-
son. The representative lawyer was disap-
pointed to hear the court ruling but was sat-
isfied with the court's acknowledgement that
in this information society a simple leak of 
personal information can cause mental 
suffering.
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